Essays on Education-Occupation (Mis-)Match in Labour Market



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ABSTRACT

Education is considered as a key determinant of earnings and in turn economic growth (Dickson & Harmon, 2011). However, this relationship may be undermined in the presence of incongruity between attained education of a worker and the required education by her occupation, popularly called education-occupation mismatch (EOM) (Hartog, 2000; Leuven & Oosterbeek, 2011). Understanding EOM provides a new mechanism to understand the wage determination in the labour markets of developing countries where educational outcomes are on the rise but jobs are not growing at the same pace. Using data from the latest nationally representative survey on employment and unemployment conditions collected by India's National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) in 2011-12, this dissertation attempts to understand the relevance of EOM for two crucial aspects of the labour market – dispersion in returns to education and informality.

The first essay examines the relationship between EOM and within-education group dispersion in returns and attempts to contribute to the long-standing debate on why workers with similar education are paid different wages. Borrowing from the assignment model of wage determination (Sattinger, 1993), this study hypothesizes that it is not only the human capital and job characteristics which are central in explaining within-education group dispersion in returns, but the interaction of the supply- and demand-side factors as indicated by EOM is also crucial. This argument is based on the literature which finds overeducated workers enduring significant wage penalties and undereducated workers receiving considerable wage rewards as compared to their matched counterparts with the same level of education (Hartog, 2000; Leuven & Oosterbeek, 2011). The finding signals that match status (adequately educated, overeducated, or undereducated) of workers in the labour market, by affecting returns to education, could explain a part of within-education group dispersion in returns (Martins & Pereira, 2004). Hence, this study explores how matching of workers to jobs alters the structure of within-education group dispersion in returns in the labour market. Applying a double sample selection bias correction and quantile wage regression estimation, the analysis reveals interesting findings. First, on average, overeducated workers suffer a wage penalty of seven percent and undereducated workers do not receive a wage reward as compared to their adequately educated counterparts. Second, the inclusion of match status reduces within-education group dispersion in returns. The finding highlights that ignoring EOM and thus, adopting a restrictive view of similarity across workers may lead to overestimation of the within-education group dispersion in returns. This study argues for focusing on EOM to increase both pecuniary and social benefits of education in terms of productivity gains and wages as well as to reduce wage dispersion.

The second essay contributes to the literature on wage determination by examining the intertwining relationship between informality and EOM and the consequent impact on the workers' wages. Considering informality from the dimensions of both, sector of work (nature of firm) and type of employment, the study discusses three issues. First, the relative importance of informality and EOM in determining the wages of workers. Second, the relevance of EOM for formal and informal workers. Third, the significance of formal-informal wage gap for matched and mismatched workers. The main results of the analysis are as follows. First, considering the individual impact of informality on wages, the results are consistent with the existing literature. Both the informal sector and informally employed workers earn lower wages than their formal counterparts. Second, segregating the data first by formal and informal sector and formally employed workers. However, for informal sector and informally employed workers tend to lose the most. They do not get rewarded for being undereducated but suffer a higher penalty

for being overeducated as compared to their formal counterparts. Lastly, the wage gap between formal and informal workers varies across all the match groups. The study highlights the need for considering the bifurcation of formal-informal workers to understand the complete dynamics of EOM especially for developing countries where informality is predominant.

Keywords: Education-occupation mismatch, Dispersion in returns to education, Informality, India.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- EOM Education-Occupation Mismatch
- EUS Employment and Unemployment Survey
- FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
- HCT Human Capital Theory
- ILO International Labour Office
- INR Indian Rupees
- JA Job Analysis
- JCM Job Competition Model
- NCEUS National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector
- NCO National Classification of Occupation
- NSSO National Sample Survey Office
- OLS Ordinary Least Squares
- PMRPY Pradhan Mantri Rojgar Protsahan Yojana
- QR Quantile Regression
- RM Realized Matches
- Rs. Rupees
- SNP-Semi-Non-Parametric
- WA-Workers' Self-Assessment

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