Temporal Perspectives on Distribution Channel Relationships

A THESIS

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BY

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Abstract

Opportunism is one of the critical research phenomenon in distribution channel relations due to its detrimental effect on relationship quality and performance. Scholars in this area have widely studied various factors that are critical in controlling opportunism and maintaining successful channel relationships such as use of specific investments, creating a dependence structure and use of relational norms (Hawkins et al., 2008; Kang and Jindal, 2015). However, most of these studies take a static view of channel relationships which not only limits our understanding of these relationships but also fail to capture their life-cycle progression (Harmeling et al., 2015). We believe the lifecycle dimension of channel relationships, i.e., the relationship-stage at which a particular channel relationship is, can hugely impact the channel outcomes resulting from various initiatives and relationship building measures (Zhang et al., 2016).

Transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective proposes relationship specific investment (RSI) as an essential measure to control channel partner's opportunism (Ganesan, 1994; Heide and John 1988; Palmatier et al., 2007; Williamson, 1985). Although RSI- opportunism relationship is among one the most studied relationship in distribution channel research, the literature reports mixed and inconclusive findings (Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Liu et al., 2014). In this thesis, we examine these inconsistencies with respect to the lifecycle dimension of channel relationships. Specifically, we studied the dynamic influence of RSI on channel partner opportunism across different relationship stages.

We used the inter-organizational life-cycle model of relationship stages (Dwyer et al., 1987) to conceptualize and hypothesize the RSI-opportunism relationship at four stages (exploration, build-up, maturity, and decline) of distribution channel relationships. We used the contractual relationship perspective, commitment-trust perspective, relational norm perspective, and power-

dependence perspective in the four relationship stages respectively. Further, we conceptualized opportunism as weak and strong opportunism to incorporate the considerations of bounded rationality and loose contracts that can allow direct as well as an indirect violation in the form of weak and strong opportunism (Luo, 2006).

To empirically test our research model, we collected dyadic matched data from 266 manufacturer-channel partner pairs in consumer appliances, home and office furniture products, automobile, office automation, and industrial products across India. This research context captures channel relationships from very early to matured stages and ensures greater generalizability of our findings (Cass, Heirati and Viet, 2014).

This study contributes to literature on distribution channel relationship by reconciling the inconsistencies in RSI-opportunism (weak and strong) relationship. Except for exploration stage, we found significant RSI-opportunism relationship in varying degree and direction. Moderation analysis by stage defining variables in different stages provided support for the proposed hypotheses and advance the knowledge on RSI-opportunism relationship in distribution channel literature.

This study suggests two significant insights for practicing managers. First, knowing the relationship stage classification and factors which improves relationship quality in each of those stages, managers can work towards minimizing partner opportunism and devise better channel management strategies. Second, the effectiveness of specific stage defining variables (perceived fairness, commitment, relational norm and dependence) provides a guideline to managers for allocating their resources effectively.

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Appendix -1

Channel-Partner Questionnaire

Thank you for agreeing to be a part of this survey. This survey is for academic research at IIM Indore and all the information provided by you will be kept confidential. Your participation to this survey is completely voluntary.

There are no right or wrong answers, so please provide your open and honest opinion against each question.

The present study is being conducted by the undersigned under the guidance of Dr. Vikas Goyal, Faculty **Indian Institute of Management, Indore**. In case you have any question or suggestion, please feel free to ask the interviewer or contact us through e-mail.

Warm regards

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Answer these questions keeping the company in view , for whom you are a dealer/dealer/retailer	
Please write the initials of the selected company (e.g. TE for Toyota Enterprises):	

Based on the definition given for each stage, kindly categorize the relationship of your organization with this company in any one of the categories, by selecting the stage with a tick (\checkmark) mark.

Exploration	Both firms are discovering and testing the goal compatibility, integrity, and performance of (be other, as well as potential obligations, benefits, and burdens involved with working together on a long-term basis
Build-up	Both firms are receiving increasing benefits from the relationship, and a level of trust and satisfaction has been developed such that they are more willing to become committed to the relationship on a long-term basis
Maturity	Both firms have an ongoing, long-term relationship in which both are receiving acceptable levels of satisfaction and benefits from the relationship.
Decline	One or both members have begun to experience dissatisfaction and are contemplating relationship termination, considering alternative manufacturers or customers, and beginning to communicate an intent to end the relationship

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree		lightly agree		Agree	;	Stro Agr	ngly ee
1	2	3	4		5		6)		7
trained s	nade significates alespeople, with this co	etc. dedica	1 7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	of the investi		any, we would e made in this	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	invested s o this relation		in personnel	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
we would		lot of knowle	this company, edge regarding	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
_	eany deceives required by co		al information	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This comp provision.	any exploits	our specific	assets without	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
_	rial expertise,		resources, such uman talents as	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
_	•		obligations in the assigned	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This compa	any sometime	es violates cor	ntract items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This compa	any stands by	unconcerned	l when we are	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This compa	ny withholds	full effort and	cooperation in	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

our exchange relationship.

This company sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This company treats us unfairly in the exchange relationship.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This company could not make any adjustment to adapt to our special requirement.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
We work very intensively with one or more partners of this company.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
We have a very close relationship with one or more partners of this company.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Our firm's relationship with the partners of this company is not at arm's length.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
We have a very collaborative relationship with one or more partners of this company, like a real team.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	U 3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	0 1	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Communications are prompt and timely.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Information provided is relevant for decision-making.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Communications are complete.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The channels of communication are well understood	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If our relationship was discontinued with this company, we would have difficulty in making up the sales volume in this trading area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This company is crucial to our future performance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It would be difficult for us to replace this company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

in this trading area							
We are dependent on this company for sales in this region	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
We do not have a good alternative of this company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This company is important to our business	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This company's product lines are essential to round out our product offering	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If our relationship was discontinued, we would have difficulty replacing this company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	<i>C</i> ,	Neither Agree nor Disagree	0 2	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In the relationship with their dealers, the supplier and their personnel							
Promote bilateral communication with dealers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
High level of two-way communication exists	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Do not discriminate but rather treat all dealers similarly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Apply consistent policies and decision-making procedures across all dealers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sometimes alter their policies in response to dealer objections	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Seriously consider a dealer's objections to the supplier's policies and programs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Seldom explains their decisions to dealers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Provide valid reasons for any changes in policies affecting the dealers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Are knowledgeable about the local situation faced	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
by the dealers							
Take pains to learn the local conditions under which the dealers operate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Treat the dealers with respect	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Are polite and well-mannered	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Name of your organization	
Respondent's name	
Your designation	
Your work experience (with the present organization)	(years)
Your total work experience	(years)

Thanks for your feedback ...

Appendix -2

Manufacturer Questionnaire

Thank you for agreeing to be a part of this survey. This survey is for academic research at IIM Indore and all the information provided by you will be kept confidential. Your participation to this survey is completely voluntary.

There are no right or wrong answers, so please provide your open and honest opinion against each question.

India	n Institute of	Managen	•	In case you l		_		as Goyal, Faculty please feel free to
Warn	n regards							
Docto Conta	o vrat Sanyal oral Student – act: f14priyvr 75 2938 363		ng Area, IIM I i dr.ac.in	ndore				
Answ	er these quest	tions kee	ping one of yo	our dealers i	in view,			
	e write the prises):	initials	of the selec	eted dealer	(e.g. KI	E for Krishn	a	
		_		•	•	rize the relatinge with a tick		your organization
	Exploration	perfori		other, as wel	l as poter	ntial obligation	_	integrity, and , and burdens
	Build-up	trust a	nd satisfactio	n has been	develope		ney are mo	and a level of ore willing to
	Maturity				_	lationship in sits from the re		are receiving
	Decline	conten	nplating relation	onship termi	nation, co	_	rnative mai	tion and are nufacturers or tionship
I am t	the most know	vledgeabl	e person in th	is company a	bout our	company's de	ealing with	this supplier.
	sagree	sagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither nor Disaş	Agree gree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
					_			

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	0 1	Neither Agree nor Disagree	0 3	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

This dealer has gone out of their way to link us with	1	2)	3	4	5	6
their business	7	_	•	3	7	3	J
This dealer has tailored its merchandise and procedures to meet the specific needs of our company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It would be difficult for this dealer to recoup their investment in us if they switched to another firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer deceives us in critical information sharing as required by contract.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer exploits our specific assets without provision.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer fails to invest various resources, such as managerial expertise, capital or human talents as required by contract	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer evades contractual obligations in selling products or coverage of the assigned territory.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer sometimes violates contract items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer stands by unconcerned when we are suffering.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer withholds full effort and cooperation in	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

our exchange relationship.							
This dealer sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer treats us unfairly in the exchange relationship.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer could not make any adjustment to adapt to our special requirement.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither nor Disagre	•	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4		5	6	7

We work very intensively with one or more partners of this dealer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
We have a very close relationship with one or more partners of this dealer.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Our firm's relationship with the partners of this dealer is not distant.			3	4	5	6	7
We have a very collaborative relationship with one or more partners of this dealer, like a real team.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Communications are prompt and timely.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Information provided is relevant for decision-making.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Communications are complete.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The channels of communication are well understood	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

This dealer responds quickly to our request for help.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer devotes more time to us when we need help.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer adjusts his/her marketing program for us when necessary.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer provides special aid to us when we are in trouble.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If our relationship was discontinued with this dealer, we would have difficulty in making up the sales volume in this trading area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer is crucial to our future performance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It would be difficult for us to replace this dealer in this trading area	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
We are dependent on this dealer for sales in this region	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
We do not have a good alternative to this dealer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
This dealer generates high sales volume for us.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Name of your organization	
Your designation	
Your work experience (with the present organization)	(years)
Your total work experience	(years)

Thanks for your feedback ...

Appendix -3 Profile of respondent sample

Industry	Dyads	Supplier firm (N= 279)	Channel Partner (N=275)
Automotive	Passenger Car Manufacturer- Dealer	18	14
	Two Wheeler Manufacturer- Dealer	18	18
	Passenger Car Spare- Dealer	16	16
Consumer durables	Branded furniture manufacturer- Dealer	116	108
	Home Electronic appliances manufacturer – Dealer	55	62
Industrial Products	Building hardware and paints manufacturer - Dealer	29	29
	Heavy machinery manufacturer - Dealer	27	28
Relationship F	Phase		
	Exploration	47	51
	Build-up	79	77
	Maturity	110	108
	Decline	43	39
Total matched dyad 266			